





Consciousness, the Minimal Self, and Brain1
Abstract
This paper explores the possibility of a neuroscientific explanation of consciousness, and 
what such an explanation might look like. More specifically, I will be concerned with the 
claim that for any given experience there is neural representational system that constitutes 
the minimal supervenience base of that experience. I will call this hypothesis the minimal 
supervenience thesis. I argue that the minimal supervenience thesis is subject to two rea-
dings, which I call the localist and holist readings. Localist theories seek to identify the 
minimal supervenience base for specific experiences. They sideline questions about the 
nature of creature consciousness, treating the neural basis of creature consciousness as 
merely a causally necessary background condition for a particular conscious experience. 
Holists on the other hand prioritise creature consciousness and argue that we can only 
account for particular states of consciousness in the context of an account of creature con-
sciousness. I argue that any scientific explanation of consciousness must account for what 
I will call a minimal sense of self that is intrinsic to every conscious state. Holist theories 
are best able to accommodate this feature. I end by arguing that the Dynamic Sensorimotor 
(DSM) account of consciousness can be combined with a holist account of the neural basis 
of consciousness. Such a combination of views corrects for the opposition to the minimal 
supervenience thesis found in some prominent defenders of the DSM account (e.g. Alva Noë 
and Evan Thompson). It also provides a framework for developing a neuroscientific account 
















under	 the	 ESF	 Eurocores	 Consciousness	 in	
the	Natural	and	Cultural	Context	scheme	for	

















In	 a	 similar	 spirit	 Nancy	 Kanwisher	 (2001),	 in	 an	 influential	 paper	 on	 the	
neural	correlates	of	perceptual	awarness,	has	written:
“I	hope	 in	 this	 article	 to	 show	 that	 scientific	 evidence	can	bear	 importantly	on	a	number	of	


















































































For	 discussion	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 con-
ceivability	 and	 possibility	 see	 the	 essays	
in	 Gendler	 &	 Hawthorne	 (2002),	 and	 for	 a	









Philosophers	 in	 this	 first	 camp	 take	 a	 simi-
lar	stance	to	Chalmers’	(2002b)	type	A	mate-
rialists.	Chalmers	offers	as	examples	of	type	







the	 neurophilosophical	 approach	 I	 will	 pur-







Chalmers	 (2002)	 calls	 philosophers	 in	 this	
second	camp	“type	B	materialists”.	Examples	
























































Certainly,	 there	are	 important	and	 interesting	connections	between	 the	sub-











a	 conscious	 experience:	 animals	 and	 infants	 have	 a	 subjective	 mental	 life.	






























I	 don’t	 mean	 to	 suggest	 that	 these	 two	 re-




Why	 have	 I	 chosen	 to	 pursue	 a	 neuroscien-
tific	approach	to	explaining	consciousness	as	


















tions	of	 consciousness.	 I	do	 take	a	 stand	on	
metaphysical	questions	relating	to	the	truth	or	
otherwise	 of	 physicalism.	 Questions	 of	 this	









J.	 Kiverstein,	 Consciousness,	 the	 Minimal	
Self,	and	Brain340
be	in)	and	“creature-consciousness”,	which	he	characterises	as	the	property	
























creature	consciousness,	 localist theories.	They	are	 localist	 in	 the	sense	 that	
they	attempt	to	pinpoint	or	localise	the	neural	activity	that	is	correlated	with	
specific	types	of	experience.	It	should	be	noted	that	localisation	of	this	kind	
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see	Hohwy	in	progress)	that	it	can’t	be	right	to	define	creature	consciousness	
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How	 do	 we	 determine	 which	 neurons	 belong	 to	 a	 particular	 neural	 repre-
sentational	system	and	which	do	not?	How	do	we	know	when	we	have	the	








lar	 type,	but	only	 in	 the	context	of	 the	right	causal	background	conditions.	
Amongst	these	background	conditions	will	be	neural	activity	that	is	correlated	
with	creature-consciousness.	Creature	consciousness	is	taken	to	be	at	best	a	











3. The localist account of NCCs








posed	of	 features	 such	as	 colour,	 shape,	 size,	volume,	orientation	etc.	Any	
given	 visual	 experience	 is	 built	 out	 of	 these	 features.	 Notice	 that	 this	 is	 a	
8
Block	(2005)	argues	that	the	neural	correlates	
































radical	advocate	of	 localism.	Zeki	has	argued	 for	 the	existence	of	what	he	



























of	different	 sensory	attributes	 are	 correlated	with	processing	 in	 specialised	






of	 the	 neural	 basis	 of	 visual	 experience	 of	 particular	 visual	 attributes	 that	
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face	 to	 subject’s	 right	 eye	 while	 flashing	 a	 stream	 of	 constantly	 changing	
colour	patches	to	the	other	eye.	The	experience	of	the	angry	face	image	was	



























of	 a	 bound	 visual	 percept)	 and	 unified	 con-
sciousness.	 I	 am	 discussing	 the	 account	 he	
















pocampal	place	 area	 (PPA).	FFA	 responds	 twice	 as	 strongly	 to	 faces	 as	 to	
other	 stimuli,	 while	 PPA	 responds	 strongly	 to	 place-related	 stimuli.	 	 They	










She	 claims	 that	 it	 is	 only	 in	 the	 context	 of	 processing	 that	 binds	 together	
representations	 to	 a	particular	 time	and	place	 that	 activity	of	 this	kind	can	
contribute	to	visual	experience.	According	to	Kanwisher,	conscious	experi-
ence	may	be	the	outcome	of	interactions	“between	domain-specific	systems	





Her	 account	of	 the	NCC	 takes	experience	 to	be	correlated	with	activity	 in	
cortical	areas	–	the	ventral	and	dorsal	pathways.	Kanwisher,	like	other	local-
ists,	 identifies	 the	NCC	for	a	given	visual	experience	with	an	experience’s	







Now	that	we	have	a	 few	examples	of	 localist	 theories	before	us,	 it	 is	 time	

















This	criticism	relates	 to	a	point	I	made	at	 the	outset	of	 this	section.	Local-































that	 the	 neural	 activity	 underlying	 creature	 consciousness	 is	 a	 constitutive	
























4. The holist’s account






































voluntary	 movements,	 and	 cannot	 speak.	 They	 show	 some	 signs	 of	 atten-





because	 they	 lack	consciousness	of	what	 they	are	 sensing.	Further	 support	
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
44	(2/2007)	pp.	(335–360)
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for	 the	claim	that	 there	 is	a	conceptual	connection	between	 the	capacity	 to	
act	intentionally	and	consciousness	comes	from	absence	automatism.	Patients	
in	the	midst	of	an	absence	seizure	exhibit	motor	behaviours	of	the	type	you	
















2007).	The	 classic	 work	 of	 Penfield	 and	 Jaspers	 (1954)	 with	 epileptic	 pa-
tients	 falls	 into	 this	 category.	 Penfield	 and	 Jaspers	 attempted	 to	 cure	 their	
patient’s	 intractable	 epilepsy	 by	 removing	 large	 areas	 of	 cortex.	They	 car-
ried	out	these	procedures	under	local	anaesthesia,	eliciting	reports	from	the	









One	way	 to	answer	our	question	would	 therefore	be	 to	 identify	a	common	










Patients	 with	 locked-in	 syndrome	 may	 be	
thought	to	constitute	a	counterexample	to	this	
proposal.	These	patients	are	conscious	unlike	
patients	 with	 akinetic	 mutism,	 but	 like	 the	
latter	 patients	 they	 cannot	 initiate	 voluntary	
movement	 with	 the	 important	 exception	 of	









Dominique	 Bauby’s	 (1998)	 moving	 account	
of	his	 experience	of	 locked-in	 syndrome	 re-
counted	 entirely	 through	 blinking	 to	 know	








Alkire	 and	his	 colleagues	 take	 their	 finding	 to	provide	 support	 for	 the	hy-













The	remainder	of	 the	loop	(i.e.	 the	intralaminar	nuclei	 located	in	the	thala-

























































“I	 see	 one	 powerful	 fact	 emerging	 about	 the	 critical	 region	 of	 the	 brain	 stem	 we	 have	 been	














by	 the	brain.	Damasio	 suggests	 that	 the	way	 for	 the	brain	 to	 represent	 the	
relation	of	the	organism	to	an	object	would	be	for	the	brain	to	produce	what	








count	of	core	consciousness	 is	 therefore	an	explanation	of	 the	contrast	be-
tween	consciousness	and	its	absence.	However,	the	neural	mechanisms	that	
account	 for	 the	 specific	contents	of	experience	also	 feed	 into	 this	account.	
Damasio	characterises	 these	mechanisms	as	having	 the	function	of	supply-
ing	something-to-be-known	 to	 the	organism.	Damage	 to	 these	mechanisms	














that	 form	 the	 basis	 for	 core	 consciousness.	 However	 it	 is	 only	 by	 making	
connections	with	areas	involved	in	the	construction	of	the	second-order	maps	























5. Towards a DSM account 








and signals	 from	 the	adjustments	of	 the	body,	which	are	necessary	 for	perception	 to	occur.”	
(1999:	147)
On	Damasio’s	account,	creature	consciousness	is	the	result	of	the	integration	























brought	 about	 through	movement	 of	 the	 relevant	 sense	 organ,	 head,	 upper	



















ceptual	 experience	 is	 mediated	 by	 implicit	 knowledge	 or	 understanding	 of	
these	patterns	of	sensorimotor	contingency.	Its	central	thesis	is	that	perceptual	
experience	just	is	the	exercise	of	sensorimotor	knowledge.	The	core	idea	as	
I	understand	it	 is	 that	perceivers	 that	can	exercise	sensorimotor	knowledge	























while	 backward	 movement	 generates	 contraction.	 Blinking,	 turning	 away,	















Thus	 the	DSM	account	 seems	 to	have	a	promising	story	 to	 tell	 about	why	







(2)	 Predictions	 about	 the	motor	 and	 sensory	 consequences	of	 carrying	out	
a	particular	motor	plan.	Such	predictions	will	be	fuelled	by	what	I	have	
earlier	called	“sensorimotor	knowledge”.

































































The	 holist	 account	 of	 NCCs	 I	 have	 been	 developing	 can	 however	 accom-
modate	all	 three	of	 the	 features	Thompson	rightly	 takes	 to	be	definitive	of	
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Julian Kiverstein
Bewusstsein, minimales Selbst und Gehirn
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel macht von der Möglichkeit Gebrauch, das Phänomen des Bewusstseins neurowis-
senschaftlich zu erklären, und geht der Frage nach, wie eine solche Erklärung wohl auszusehen 
hätte. Der Verfasser widmet sich konkret der These, dass jeder Erfahrung ein repräsentatives 
neurales System zugrunde liegt, das als Supervenienzgrundlage dieser Erfahrung dient. Diese 
Hypothese wird im weiteren Verlauf als minimale Supervenienz-These bezeichnet. Nach Mei-
nung des Autors kann diese These auf zweierlei Weisen verstanden werden; dementsprechend ist 
von einer lokalistischen und einer holistischen Lesart die Rede. Lokalistische Theorien versu-
chen, die minimale Supervenienzgrundlage einer spezifischen Erfahrung zu ermitteln, während 
sie Fragen über die Natur des Bewusstseins von Lebewesen beiseite lassen und die Neuralbasis 
des Bewusstseins lediglich als kausal-notwendige Hintergrundvoraussetzung für eine partiku-
läre Bewusstseinserfahrung werten. Holisten hingegen räumen dem Bewusstsein von Lebewe-
sen Vorrang ein und behaupten, dass partikuläre Bewusstseinszustände nur im Rahmen von 
Deutungen ebendieses Bewusstseins erklärt werden können. Nach Meinung des Autors muss 
jegliche wissenschaftliche Deutung des Bewusstseins jenem Faktor Rechnung tragen, den er als 
minimale Wahrnehmung des Selbst bezeichnet und das jedem Bewusstseinszustand intrinsisch 
ist. Holistische Theorien sind am besten geeignet, diesen Umstand zu verändern. Der Artikel 
schließt mit der These, dass die sog. Dynamisch-Sensomotorische (DSM) Deutung des Bewusst-
seins mit der holistischen Erklärung der Neuralbasis des Bewusstseins kombiniert werden kann. 
Eine solchermaßen kombinierte Sichtweise korrigiert den Widerspruch bezüglich der These von 
der minimalen Supervenienz, die bei einigen prominenten Befürwortern der DSM-These (z.B. 
Alva Noë und Evan Thompson) zu finden ist. Sie ermöglicht ebenfalls einen Rahmen für die Ent-
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Julian Kiverstein
La Conscience, le Soi Minimal et le Cerveau
Resumé
L’article cherche à savoir si une explication neuroscientifique de la conscience est possible et 
à quoi elle pourrait ressembler. Plus particulièrement, je me pencherai sur l’affirmation qu’à 
chaque expérience donnée correspond un système de représentation neural qui constitue la 
base de survenance minimale de cette expérience. J’appellerai cette hypothèse « la thèse de 
survenance (supervenience) minimale ». Je soutiens que cette thèse peut se lire de deux façons 
que je nommerai lectures localiste et holiste. Les théories localistes cherchent à définir quelle 
est la base de survenance minimale des expériences particulières. Elles laissent de côté les 
questions sur la nature de la conscience des êtres et considèrent la base neurale de leur consci-
ence comme une condition causale circonstancielle nécessaire à l’expérience d’une conscience 
particulière. Les holistes, d’autre part, donnent la priorité à la conscience des êtres et affir-
ment que nous pouvons rendre compte des états de conscience particuliers seulement dans un 
contexte d’explication de la conscience des êtres. J’affirme que toute explication scientifique 
de la conscience doit rendre compte de ce que j’appellerai « une sensation minimale de soi », 
intrinsèque à tout état conscient. Les théories holistes sont les plus aptes à tenir compte de cet 
aspect. Enfin, j’affirme que l’explication sensori-motrice dynamique de la conscience peut se 
combiner avec une approche holiste de la base neurale de la conscience. Une telle combinaison 
d’approches compense l’opposition à la thèse de survenance minimale de certains défenseurs 
de l’explication sensori-motrice dynamique distingués (ex. Alva Noë et Evan Thompson). Elle 
offre également un cadre de développement pour une explication neuroscientifique de la sensa-
tion minimale de soi.
Mots-clés
corrélats	neuraux	de	la	conscience,	état	mental	conscient,	conscience	de	créature,	sens	minimal	de	soi,	
conscience	pré-réflexive	de	soi,	dynamique	sensori-motrice
